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LONGITUDINAL GUILT: REPEAT OFFENDERS, PLEA 
BARGAINING, AND THE VARIABLE STANDARD OF PROOF 
Russell D. Covey∗ 
Abstract 
 
This Article introduces a new concept—“longitudinal guilt”—which 
invites readers to reconsider basic presuppositions about the way our 
criminal justice system determines guilt in criminal cases. In short, the 
idea is that a variety of features of criminal procedure, most 
importantly, plea bargaining, conspire to change the primary 
“truthfinding mission” of criminal law from one of adjudicating 
individual historical cases to one of identifying dangerous “offenders.” 
This change of mission is visible in the lower proof standards we apply 
to repeat criminal offenders.  
The first section of this Article explains how plea bargaining and 
graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history effectively 
combine to lower the standard of proof for repeat criminals. The second 
section describes several additional procedural and evidentiary rules 
that further effectively reduce the standard of proof for recidivists. The 
third section argues that the net effect is a criminal justice system that is 
primarily focused on the identification of a class of “dangerous 
offenders” based upon their repeated interactions with the system over 
time rather than the accurate resolution of specific allegations of 
wrongdoing in individual cases, as is conventionally supposed. In a 
phrase, we have moved toward a system that constructs guilt 
“longitudinally.” This Article concludes with a few brief thoughts on 
the merits and demerits of longitudinal guilt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A prominent assumption of criminal law is that there is a uniform, 
and uniformly demanding, burden of proof that must be met by the 
prosecution in order to convict a defendant. That burden of proof—
beyond a reasonable doubt, or BARD for short—is a matter of both 
faith and constitutional law; the Supreme Court has long recognized the 
prosecutor’s burden to prove each element of a charged crime to this 
standard.1 Most theorists who have written about the standard of proof 
in criminal cases assume that the BARD standard requires fact-finders 
to be very certain of the defendant’s guilt before returning a guilty 
verdict. Those prone to think quantitatively have suggested that the 
BARD standard represents something like a 90%–95% likelihood of 
guilt.2  
The BARD standard is conventionally thought to have a fixed, if 
somewhat imprecise, meaning that does not vary from case to case. As a 
formal matter, the same reasonable doubt proof standard applies to 
jaywalking and capital murder trials alike.3 Opinions differ, however, 
regarding whether this is really an accurate description of criminal law, 
and if it is, whether this is normatively desirable. Scholars such as Dean 
Erik Lillquist have argued that the unwavering BARD label masks a 
variable substantive standard and that this substantive variability is a 
good thing.4 Another school of thought takes the position that BARD in 
fact represents an unwavering standard but that variability, if we could 
capture it, would be normatively preferable. Recent work by Professors 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970). 
 2. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. REV. 
951, 996 (2003) (“[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally defined, insofar as it or any 
burden of proof can be quantified, as a percentage as high as 85% or 95%.”); Christopher 
Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 306 (2006) (describing “the 
standard quantifications of ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ as a 90 to 95% degree of 
certainty”); Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some 
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999) (citing surveys of judges 
indicating belief that jurors should be roughly 90% certain of guilt before convicting under 
reasonable doubt standard). 
 3. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 364 (holding that the Due Process Clause requires 
prosecutors to prove each element of every criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt). 
 4. See generally Erik Lillquist, Recasting Reasonable Doubt: Decision Theory and the 
Virtues of Variability, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 85 (2002) (arguing that a variable reasonable 
doubt standard is preferable to a fixed standard). 
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Ronald Allen and Larry Laudan,5 and more explicit work by Laudan in 
follow-up papers, take this position.6 
The argument is simple and seemingly compelling. The expected 
utility theory teaches that rational actors operating under uncertainty 
will seek to maximize their utility by selecting choices that hold the 
greatest expected utility understood as “the sum of the utility of the 
possible outcomes after the decision, weighed by the probability of each 
possible outcome.”7 In a criminal case, there are four possible outcomes 
a jury must consider: a true conviction of a guilty person, a true 
acquittal of an innocent person, a false conviction of an innocent person, 
and a false acquittal of a guilty person. Thus, as Lillquist explains: 
[T]he expected utility of a decision to convict a defendant 
is the utility of an accurate conviction—weighted by the 
probability the defendant is in fact guilty—plus the 
disutility of an erroneous conviction—weighted by the 
probability the defendant is in fact not guilty.  
Proponents of a high standard of proof point to the presumed non-
equivalence in expected (dis)utilities of false acquittals and false 
convictions. False convictions are commonly thought to be substantially 
worse—that is, to have a greater expected disutility—than false 
acquittals.8 That assumption undergirds the widely embraced cliché—
sometimes referred to as the Blackstone Ratio—that it is better to acquit 
                                                                                                                     
 5. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEX. TECH. L. 
REV. 65 (2008); Larry Laudan & Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010). Allen and Laudan argue that rather than looking at the ratio of 
false acquittals and false convictions to gauge whether the system is performing appropriately, it 
is far more sensible to compare the (negative) utility of false convictions to the (negative) utility 
of false acquittals. That ratio, at least, tells us something about how costly it is when the legal 
system produces an inaccurate result and gives us a sense of which side to err on and by how 
much. Laudan makes this point more explicitly in a separate paper.  
 6. See generally Larry Laudan, The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal 
Justice, 5 EPISTEME 282 (2008). In subsequent work, Laudan refines this analysis by 
demonstrating that the desirable standard of proof, more precisely, depends on the relative 
utilities of both true and false convictions and acquittals and thus can only be calculated by 
comparing the utilities of all four of the possible trial outcomes. See Larry Laudan & Harry 
Saunders, Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus About the Utilities 
of Trial Outcomes, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 3 (2009), available at 
http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1099 &context=ice; Larry Laudan, Taking 
the Ratio of Differences Seriously: The Multiple Offender and the Standard of Proof, or 
Different Strokes for Serial Folks 1 (July 8, 2009) [hereinafter Laudan, Ratio] (unpublished 
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431616. This refinement does not really 
matter for purposes of this paper, and therefore, I will ignore it here. 
 7. Lillquist, supra note 4, at 90. 
 8. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Toward a New Paradigm of Criminal Justice: How the 
Innocence Movement Merges Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 133, 133–
34 (“Our constitutional system chooses protecting the innocent as a highest-order value, which 
preferences innocence protection over convicting wrongdoers.”). 
3
Covey: Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Va
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
434 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
ten guilty persons than to convict an innocent one.9 A high standard of 
proof reflects the intuition that it is better to err on the side of acquitting 
arguably innocent defendants, even if it is likely they are guilty, given 
the disproportionate disutility of false convictions.  
Even if this proposition is true as a general matter, variability 
advocates reject the assumption that the disutilities of false convictions 
and false acquittals are the same in all cases. Certainly, they argue, false 
acquittals of some especially dangerous criminals—say, terrorists, serial 
rapists, mass murderers, and the like—are more costly to society if 
those false acquittals permit the acquittee to engage in future acts of 
terrorism, rape, and murder than are false acquittals of persons who 
commit minor crimes or who are less likely to engage in future criminal 
conduct.  
Indeed, as Laudan points out, this logic can be extended to repeat 
offenders as a class. After all, empirical data demonstrate that repeat 
offenders commit more crimes after release than first-time offenders.10 
If so, the cost to society of falsely acquitting repeat offenders is 
necessarily greater than the cost of falsely acquitting first-time 
offenders.11 At the same time, false convictions of persons without prior 
criminal records hurt society—and those persons12—more than false 
convictions of serial criminals, and false acquittals of first-time 
offenders cost society less, perhaps far less, than false acquittals of 
serial criminals. Based on these observations, Laudan concludes that the 
standard of proof should be lower in trials of those with extensive 
criminal histories than it is for those without a record of wrongdoing.13 
Lillquist reaches the same conclusion.14 
I do not quibble with the argument’s premises, which I think, by-
and-large, are probably correct. What I do take issue with is the 
conclusion that affirmative change in the formal standard of proof is 
warranted.15 That conclusion necessarily assumes that the criminal 
justice system currently assesses the guilt or innocence of repeat 
offenders no differently than first-time offenders. This is incorrect.  
The mistake, I contend, is that those arguing for a lower formal or 
informal proof standard at trial pay too much attention to trials and the 
formal rules applicable to them and fail to take sufficient account of 
plea bargaining, which is, after all, responsible for producing the vast 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 174 (1997) (“The ratio 
10:1 has become known as the ‘Blackstone ratio.’”). 
 10. See Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. See infra Part I.C. 
 13. See Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 2. 
 14. See Lillquist, supra note 4, at 195 (“[C]ases involving repeat offenders perhaps should 
also have a lower standard of proof because the relative benefits of convictions, and the relative 
costs of acquittals, are higher than in other cases.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Laudan, Ratio, supra note 6, at 4 (“[W]e should be using a very different 
standard of proof for trying serial felons than we use for trying first-time offenders.”). 
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majority of criminal convictions in both state and federal courts.16 When 
the dynamics of plea bargaining are taken into account, what emerges, I 
believe, is a de facto system of justice that for the vast majority of 
repeat offenders already downwardly adjusts the effective standard of 
proof so that typical repeat offenders ultimately are judged by proof 
standards lower than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-standard formally 
on the books and, perhaps, sometimes little higher than mere probable 
cause. 
In the first section of this Article, I will explain how plea bargaining 
and graduated sentencing systems based on criminal history combine to 
effectively lower the standard of proof for repeat offenders. In the 
second section, I will describe several additional procedural and 
evidentiary rules that further effectively reduce the standard of proof for 
alleged recidivists.17 The net effect, I argue in the Article’s third section, 
is a criminal justice system far more concerned with identifying and 
incapacitating “dangerous offenders” than with producing accurate 
results in individual cases. In effect, we have developed a system that 
constructs guilt longitudinally. The Article concludes with a few brief 
thoughts on the merits and demerits of longitudinal guilt. 
I.  PLEA BARGAINING AND THE DECREASING STANDARD OF PROOF FOR 
REPEAT OFFENDERS 
To understand how plea bargaining effectively reduces the standard 
of proof for repeat offenders, we must review the incentive structures 
that induce defendants to plead guilty.18 Although criminal 
defendants—like shoppers—do not always get the best bargain possible, 
plea bargaining—like shopping—can best be understood by looking to 
the market that sets the relevant prices of the sought-for goods.  
A.  The Price of Guilty Pleas 
There are three principal inputs in the standard formula for pricing 
plea bargains: the probability of conviction (p), the expected sentence if 
convicted at trial (ets), and the resource costs of litigating the case (rd 
for defendant, rp for prosecutor).19 The relationship of these inputs can 
                                                                                                                     
 16. See Russell D. Covey, Fixed Justice: Reforming Plea Bargaining with Plea-Based 
Ceilings, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2008) (reporting that more than 95% of all state and 
federal felony convictions are obtained by guilty pleas). 
 17. In using the term “recidivists,” I refer to those defendants who have accumulated 
criminal histories. I do not mean to imply that all such defendants are, in fact, guilty of all the 
crimes for which they are charged or that they are inherently, and unpreventably, bent on 
pursuing a life of crime. 
 18. A rich literature exists discussing the economics of plea bargaining. See, e.g., Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983); Robert 
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992). 
 19. See William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 61 
(1971); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. 
REV. 713, 714 (1988); Covey, supra note 16, at 1246. 
5
Covey: Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Va
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
436 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63 
 
be expressed in a formula, where rps is the rational plea sentence:  
 
rps = (p)(ets)(rd / rp) 
 
This formula expresses a simple and relatively obvious fact about plea 
bargaining: The more likely conviction looks, and the greater the 
sentence the defendant expects if convicted at trial, the greater the 
magnitude of the plea sentence that a rational defendant will accept to 
avoid trial. Similarly, the more expensive it is to litigate the case, the 
higher the plea sentence a defendant will be willing to accept, and 
conversely, the lower the sentence a prosecutor will settle for.  
For our purposes, I assume the defendant’s resource costs are zero. 
This assumption is not actually true, of course. Defendants do pay a 
price to contest criminal charges. However, because most criminal 
defendants are indigent and thus do not absorb the full costs of trial—
indeed, the monetary cost of defending indigents is usually borne by the 
state—I think this assumption is sufficient for our purposes.20 Dropping 
resource costs from the defendant’s side of the equation, the inputs that 
remain, which determine whether the plea offer will look attractive, are 
simply the probability of conviction (p) and the expected trial sentence 
(ets).21 If the plea offer is lower than the product of those two inputs, a 
rational defendant should take the deal.22 For our purposes, it is 
important to note the dynamic relationship between p and ets. All things 
equal, rational defendants should be willing to accept the same plea 
offer in cases where p is low and ets is high, and where p is high and ets 
is low, as long as the product of p and ets remains constant.23 
This plea pricing mechanism causes variation among different types 
of defendants with respect to the effective standard of proof. Begin with 
                                                                                                                     
 20. Net costs of litigation, in other words, are likely to be tilted toward the state, which 
means that, generally speaking, prosecutors will be willing to discount plea offers downwardly 
more than defendants are willing to adjust them upwardly. 
 21. As Professor Oren Gazal-Ayal explains: 
Plea bargaining is rationalized just like any other legal settlement. Whether 
guilty or innocent, a defendant knows he might be convicted at trial. Taking 
into account the post-trial sentence and the probability of conviction, he 
determines his “highest acceptable sentence.” A defendant will only be willing 
to plead guilty in return for a sentence lower than or equal to his highest 
acceptable sentence.  
Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2302 (2006). 
 22. If we also consider resource costs in the defendant’s calculation, it becomes apparent 
that defendants sometimes have incentives to accept a plea offer that equals, or even exceeds, 
expected trial punishment. 
 23. A defendant’s aversion to risk could impact decisionmaking in this context, but the 
impact could go in either direction. Risk-averse defendants might place greater value on plea 
offers that eliminate a small risk of a disastrously long sentence. Risk-seeking defendants, on the 
other hand, might undervalue such plea offers where a plea bargain represents a certain (though 
small) punishment and the odds of conviction seem small. 
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the fact of graduated sentencing schemes that increase punishment 
based on criminal history. Recidivist punishment schemes are 
manifested in several ways. Sentencing guideline systems predictably 
increase sentencing exposure. Mandatory minimum sentencing 
provisions further lock in, with certainty, high sentences upon 
conviction for certain offenses or for offenders with criminal histories. 
Career criminal statutes create especially draconian, fixed sentence 
outcomes for serial offenders. Even absent legislative or administrative 
sentencing mandates, judges with complete sentencing discretion can be 
expected to impose harsher sentences on repeat offenders. Accordingly, 
there is no question that, in general, the more extensive a defendant’s 
criminal history, the greater the defendant’s expected trial sentence will 
be for most crimes. 24 
Next, most prosecutors are not primarily concerned with maximizing 
jail time for convicted offenders.25 For most prosecutors in most cases, 
winning a conviction is more important than maximizing punishment.26 
Where there is a tradeoff between those goals, the typical prosecutor 
will almost always settle for less punishment in exchange for 
elimination of the possibility of an acquittal at trial.27 That prosecutors 
routinely trade maximum punishment for reduction of uncertainty is 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat 
Offenders, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 735 (2001) (observing that the principle of enhanced punishment 
for repeat offenders is pervasive at all levels of criminal justice system and “so widely accepted 
that it strikes most people as simple common sense”). 
 25. See Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in CRIMINAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 145, 152 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (noting that plea bargains differ 
substantially from other legal settlements where litigants seek to maximize expected profits, in 
that the length of sentences and the resource costs of achieving the sentences are 
incommensurate, and “as agents of society,” prosecutors lack “an interest in maximizing the 
sentence in each case, since excessive sentences are costly to the public”); Josh Bowers, 
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1141 (2008) (“[Prosecutors] care little, if at 
all, about maximizing plea prices and ultimate sentence length.”).  
 26. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2471 (2004) (noting that for prosecutors, the “statistic of conviction . . . matters 
much more than the sentence”); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to 
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 137 (2004) (reporting practice in 
prosecutors’ offices of publicly tracking prosecutors’ win-loss records, or maintaining “batting 
averages”). 
 27. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, 
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 107 (1978) (finding that, “As prosecutors gain 
experience . . . they tend to stress ‘certainty of time’ rather than ‘amount of time. . . . [In other 
words], they become less concerned about extracting maximum penalties from defendants and 
more concerned with insuring that in cases in which they are looking for time, the defendant 
actually receives some time.”); Bowers, supra note 25 (arguing that at least in low stakes cases, 
prosecutors “care little, if at all, about maximizing plea prices and ultimate sentence length”); 
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2548, 2553–54 (2004) (stating, “[P]rosecutors do not try to maximize total prison 
time . . . . [because] legally authorized sentence[s] [are] harsher than the sentence prosecutors 
want to impose.”). 
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amply evidenced by the massive reliance upon plea bargaining to 
resolve criminal cases.28 Even if prosecutors were solely focused on 
maximizing jail-time for persons charged with crimes, seeking the 
maximum possible punishment for every criminal defendant would not 
make sense. Because the resource costs of trial are so high, prosecutors 
who refused to plea bargain would, in the aggregate, convict and punish 
far fewer criminals than prosecutors who plea bargain.29 While there are 
always a few high-profile cases in which prosecutors aggressively seek 
to maximize punishment and forgo punishment-reducing deals, those 
cases are the exception, not the rule.30  
Now put those two facts together. Recidivist sentencing schemes 
mean that repeat offenders can expect more severe sentences if they are 
convicted at trial than first-time offenders. Prosecutors’ preference for 
certain convictions over maximum penalties means that prosecutors will 
favor plea bargains that ensure, whenever possible, that a criminal 
defendant pleads guilty and receives at least some punishment rather 
than risk the possibility of an acquittal at trial. Longer sentences provide 
more bargaining leverage than short sentences, and thus, assuming the 
existence of a floor on the charge/sentence that will be deemed adequate 
by the prosecutor, create comparatively greater flexibility to offer plea 
discounts.31 As a result, prosecutors should find it easier to plea bargain 
with repeat offenders than with first-timers.32 
For an illustration, imagine the following. Two criminals, Newbie 
and Old-School, are both caught with cocaine in their possession and 
are charged with a drug offense. Prosecutors believe both are guilty, but 
because of some weaknesses in the cases (say, the evidence is based on 
                                                                                                                     
 28. Or to use Professor David Bjerk’s formulation, “prosecutors are risk-averse with 
respect to sentence length” due to the diminishing marginal utility of longer sentences. David 
Bjerk, On the Role of Plea Bargaining and the Distribution of Sentences in the Absence of 
Judicial System Frictions, 28 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (2008). 
 29. Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 309 (noting that plea prices are set based on a 
prosecutor’s punishment-maximizing strategy, which includes sharing the resource gains 
obtained by forgoing trial). 
 30. See, e.g., David Bierie & Kathryn Murphy, The Influence of Press Coverage on 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Examining Homicide Prosecutions, 1990–2000, 41 CRIM. L. BULL. 
60, 63 (2005) (finding that, “[M]any prosecutors indicated they would not plea bargain a case if 
it was receiving media attention.”). 
 31. Professor Bjerk has documented in an empirical study the tendency for prosecutors in 
states with three-strikes laws to use such laws to increase their bargaining leverage. See David 
Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion Under 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & ECON. 591, 591 (2005) (“[P]rosecutors become 
significantly more likely to lower a defendant’s prosecution charge to a misdemeanor when 
conviction for the initial felony arrest charge would lead to sentencing under a three-strikes 
law.”). 
 32. The existence of a minimum charge or sentence as a floor is critical to the argument 
that there is a variable standard of proof at work for repeat offenders. If prosecutors have infinite 
ability to discount plea offers, then higher criminal penalties will not create any more bargaining 
leverage than lower penalties, only longer sentences. But there is a floor, for reasons I discuss 
below. See infra Part I.C. 
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easily impeachable witnesses), an objective assessment of the 
probability of conviction in the two cases is 50%. As this would be 
Newbie’s first felony conviction, if convicted he expects to receive a 
two-year sentence. Old-School, in contrast, has several prior felony 
convictions. He expects a four-year sentence if convicted. The 
prosecutor is authorized to offer both defendants a plea deal carrying a 
one-year sentence. Now compare the value of the offer from the 
perspective of the two defendants. For Old-School, the offer is a good 
one. Because a 50% chance of getting four years is equal to a 100% 
chance of two years, the prosecutor’s offer of just one year cuts Old-
School’s expected jail-time in half. If he is rational, he should take the 
deal. Newbie’s calculus, however, is different. The one-year offer is 
merely equal to the expected value of proceeding to trial, making 
Newbie, at best, rationally indifferent to the offer in terms of jail time. 
Other considerations, which I will discuss below, would likely push 
Newbie to reject the deal. Recidivist sentencing provisions thus quite 
clearly make it easier for prosecutors to obtain guilty pleas from repeat 
criminals than from first-timers. 
Although the operative variable in the example is expected 
punishment, the outcome—Old School taking a plea offer that Newbie 
will reject—is functionally identical to one where variation occurred not 
in expected sentence but in probability of conviction, or p. If Newbie 
faces a two-year sentence upon conviction and he is offered a one-year 
deal to resolve the charges, rationally he should take the deal as long as 
he calculates p as greater than 50%. In contrast, facing a potential 
punishment twice as severe, Old-School rationally should take the deal 
as long as he calculates p as greater than 25%. The prosecutor, in other 
words, should be able to secure a conviction against Old-School in a 
case that is twice as weak as the case necessary to get Newbie to plead 
guilty. Moreover, a prosecutor unsatisfied with the prospect of Newbie 
and Old-School receiving the same sentence has flexibility, given the 
numbers, to ensure that Old-School receives more punishment than 
Newbie even though his case remains weaker than the one against 
Newbie. For example, Old-School should be willing to accept a plea 
offer of 1.5 years if he calculates p as greater than 38%. Given the 
existence of the recidivist sentencing penalties, a prosecutor could 
negotiate a one-year sentence in Newbie’s case, while obtaining a 1.5 
year sentence in a case against Old-School in which the evidence was 
only four-fifths as strong.  
Of course, the attractiveness of any particular offer will be affected 
by a defendant’s subjective preferences as to time discounting and risk 
aversion.33 But while both of those factors complicate the math, they do 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See Bjerk, supra note 28, at 2 (“[T]he plea bargain sentence for each defendant can be 
greater than, less than, or equal to the expected sentence from going to trial, depending on the 
relative degree of risk-aversion of prosecutors versus defendants and the relative bargaining 
power of each party.”); Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 313 (postulating that defendants in cases 
where p was equal to 0.75 who had a present-value discount rate of 10% would equate a fifty-
9
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not alter the basic equation. Prosecutors who are not concerned with 
maximizing jail time can cut progressively more attractive bargains with 
defendants who have more extensive criminal histories. That means that 
repeat offenders should be induced to plead guilty in cases in which 
offenders with lesser criminal histories would not. The net effect of this 
dynamic, as I discuss below, is to create a lower effective standard of 
proof for repeat offenders than for first-timers. 
B.  P and the Standard of Proof 
P is an ex ante prediction made by litigants about how a fact-finder 
will assess the proof before them. Where the evidence is weak, p will be 
low. Where it is strong, p will be high. It is directly proportionate, in 
other words, to the strength of the admissible evidence of guilt.34 The 
standard of proof, in contrast, is an ex post rubric used by the fact-finder 
to evaluate the strength of the evidence. While the standard of proof is 
expressed qualitatively, it can be thought of in quantitative terms as a 
probabilistic threshold that the proof must satisfy before the fact-finder 
will convict. It is often said that BARD equates to something like a 90% 
certainty of guilt, a preponderance of the evidence standard equates to 
50.1%, and clear and convincing something in between.35 Different 
standards of proof will produce different ex ante probabilities of 
conviction given equal quanta of proof. While overwhelming evidence 
of guilt will produce a high p under almost any standard of proof, where 
the evidence is more equivocal, p will plainly be higher if the standard 
of proof is lower, and lower if the standard of proof is higher.  
This intuition can be expressed formally as a threshold function, 
where p is the likelihood of conviction, q is the quantum of the 
evidence, and s is the standard of proof, so that: 
This characterizes p in terms of a single event and with subjective 
evaluations of q and s by the fact-finder. 
Considering p probabilistically, that is, capturing the range of 
expected outcomes viewed from an ex ante perspective, p can be 
thought of as a distribution determined by q and s, where increases in q 
produce increases in p and increases in s produce decreases in p. 
Thus, p can be written as: 
                                                                                                                     
year trial sentence with a present-value sentence of 7.43 years). 
 34. That is, the net quantum of inculpatory evidence minus exculpatory evidence. 
 35. See Lerner, supra note 2, at 996. See generally Michael S. Pardo, Second-Order Proof 
Rules, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1083 (2009) (discussing various proof standards). 
p = 1  w h e re q ≥ s an d 
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The equation makes clear that in calculating any px, the quantum of 
proof qx and the standard of proof sx are directly related. That is, if the 
standard of proof (s) goes up, the quantum of proof (q) necessary to 
achieve the same probability of conviction also goes up. If the standard 
of proof decreases, the quantum of proof necessary to convict also 
decreases. In simple terms, the prosecutor needs less evidence to 
convict if the standard of proof is low and more evidence to convict if 
the standard is high. At the same time, to achieve any lower px, either qx 
can be decreased or sx can be increased.  
In short, if a prosecutor can induce guilty pleas for equally serious 
crimes, carrying equally severe sentences, from two defendants, D1 and 
D2, but can obtain D1’s plea to a set charge and punishment with a 
lower p than necessary to induce D2 to plead guilty to the same charge 
and punishment, then D1 can be thought of as having negotiated his 
plea against what is functionally the equivalent of a reduced standard of 
proof. 
The following example might help to illustrate the point. Assume 
that there are three quanta of proof: q1, q2, and q3. Juries that apply the 
BARD standard will convict in the three cases at rates of 70%, 80%, 
and 90%, respectively. P thus equals 0.70, 0.80, and 0.90 in the three 
cases. Juries that apply the lower clear and convincing standard instead, 
given the same quanta of proof, will convict at rates of 80%, 90%, and 
100%. Imagine that prosecutors can choose to file cases in BARD court, 
where the BARD standard applies, or in C&C court, where the clear and 
convincing standard applies. Now, imagine that a prosecutor has a case 
in which the proof is q1, and that, given a particular sentence sought by 
the prosecutor, it is only rational for a defendant to plead guilty if p is 
equal to or greater than 0.80. On these assumptions, there are two ways 
the prosecutor can induce the defendant to plead guilty. She can file the 
case in BARD court and invest enough additional resources in 
investigating the case to raise q1 to q2, or she can file the case she has 
in the C&C court. The point here is that either of these strategies has 
exactly the same effect on p. Permitting the prosecutor to induce the 
same plea from defendants with different p’s under a given standard of 
proof is functionally equivalent to applying a lesser standard of proof to 
some of those defendants and a greater standard of proof to the others.36 
Given the fungible quality of ets, p, q, and s, changes in any one of 
the variables has the same impact on rational plea price as changes in 
any of the other variables. Increasing expected punishment for repeat 
offenders has the same effect—for plea bargaining purposes—as 
lowering the standard of proof for such defendants.37 This demonstrates 
                                                                                                                     
 36. This logic has been implicitly noted by other commentators. See, e.g., Adam 
Gershowitz, Raise the Proof: A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 CONN. L. REV. 85, 118–20 
(2007) (arguing for remedy of increasing standard of proof in jurisdictions that fail to adequately 
fund indigent defense and noting that one effect of higher standard of proof would be pressure 
on prosecutors to offer better plea deals to such defendants to entice them to plead guilty). 
 37. Other scholars have noted that plea bargaining, vis-à-vis trial, seems to lower the 
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that plea bargaining in a world of recidivist sentencing schemes and 
relatively unconstrained bargaining discretion produces what is, in 
effect, a progressively decreasing standard of proof for repeat offenders. 
C.  Plea Bargaining and the Special Case of First-Time Offenders 
The simple model we have been relying upon so far unrealistically 
assumes that the gradient of the slope of the expected plea sentence 
(eps) is perfectly smooth and that the prosecutor is free to offer any plea 
bargain, in any case, anywhere along that slope. That assumption is 
unrealistic because the slope available to prosecutors is lumpy, not 
smooth. That is, prosecutors cannot precisely calibrate their plea bargain 
offers to perfectly match their quantitative assessments of the value of a 
guilty plea in particular cases, because they are constrained by the 
“depth” and “distance” of charging options provided by the legal code.38 
Prosecutors may wish to offer a particular defendant a four-year deal to 
resolve, say, criminal charges involving the theft of a computer from an 
occupied residence. However, the criminal code may establish a 
minimum sentence of five years for robbery and a maximum sentence 
of three years for burglary. There may be no practical way, given the 
nature of the criminal conduct and the charge and sentencing 
distributions provided by the criminal code, to construct a plea deal that 
allows the defendant to get a four-year sentence. 
Because most criminal codes include numerous overlapping offenses 
carrying a variety of punishments, and/or permit the prosecutor wide 
discretion to negotiate sentence bargains that reflect just the desired 
amount of jail time or monetary fines, lumpiness will not create much of 
an obstacle in most cases.39 However, lumpiness does prove to be a 
fairly significant problem at the low end of the scale.40 Jail time and 
fines, of course, are not the only elements of punishment accompanying 
                                                                                                                     
standard of proof. See, e.g., Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of 
Innocents, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1321, 1332 (2003) (“However, plea bargaining would appear to 
have the effect of implicitly lowering the government’s burden of proof.”); Patricia M. Wald, 
Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Norm Gives Way to the Numbers, 1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
101, 108–09. Although I disagree with that characterization because it fails to account for the 
transfer of risk, the claim is based on logic similar to that presented here. 
 38. See Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a 
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1953–
55 (2006) (demonstrating that charge reductions frequently made during charge bargaining 
occur more often where the criminal code provides more alternative charging options for 
criminal conduct (depth) and where the penal consequences of alternative charges are modest 
(distance)). 
 39. Id. at 1955 (explaining that where the criminal code provides depth in charging 
alternatives, prosecutors can “offer a market-clearing price for a guilty plea more often”). 
 40. That is, assuming that the prosecutor is intent on obtaining a felony, rather than a 
misdemeanor, conviction. Of course, felony charges are often bargained into misdemeanors, and 
that outcome may in fact be the standard outcome in less serious cases involving offenders 
without a criminal history. In this Article, “first-offender” means first felony offense, which by 
definition involves a case in which the prosecutor refuses to permit a misdemeanor plea.  
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a criminal conviction. The collateral consequences of a felony 
conviction can be serious and, in many cases, can far overshadow the 
costs of a jail sentence alone.41 Depending on circumstances and 
jurisdictions, those consequences can include  deportation, termination 
of employment, loss of a professional license or ability to continue an 
accustomed means of making a living, loss of access to government 
loans or benefits, loss of custody of children, familial impoverishment, 
and dramatic restrictions on place of residency and freedom of 
movement, just to name a few.42 Then there is the stigma of conviction 
itself. Although the penal consequences of conviction (that is, jail time 
and fines) might be felt more or less equally and proportionately by all 
convicts, the collateral consequences and stigma accompanying 
conviction are heavily front-loaded. First-time offenders almost 
certainly have more to lose by way of collateral and stigmatic 
consequences than do repeat offenders who have already absorbed most 
of these costs.  
There are, in other words, some built-in costs that accompany a first-
time felony conviction that cannot be discounted away. That means that 
a prosecutor will be more constrained in plea bargaining a weak case 
involving a first-time offender than she would in a case involving a 
repeat offender. Prosecutors cannot offer deals to first-time offenders 
with the same dramatic discounts as are available in cases involving 
repeat offenders. Both the expected trial sentence is lower, and the fixed 
costs of conviction are higher.43 By limiting how low the expected plea 
sentence (eps) can go in first-time offender cases, these constraints 
necessarily also establish a floor for p in those cases. Where the 
evidence is relatively weak, first-time offenders will hold out for trial 
because prosecutors simply cannot make plea offers that are sufficiently 
discounted to entice first-time offenders to accept them, given the 
collateral consequences that necessarily follow.44 And by establishing a 
                                                                                                                     
 41. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences 
of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 670, 740 (2008). 
 42. See generally Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated 
Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–36 (2006) (enumerating possible collateral consequences 
resulting from felony conviction). 
 43. Although there is no direct evidence of which I am aware that repeat offenders accept 
plea offers in weaker cases than first-time offenders, there is empirical evidence that prosecutors 
use the enhanced leverage that recidivist sentencing schemes provide in plea bargaining. 
Professor Bjerk, for example, has documented an increase in misdemeanor pleas entered by 
defendants in cases in which a felony conviction would result in a third-strike triggering 
application of a mandatory three-strikes sentencing provision. See Bjerk, supra note 31, at 593 
(presenting “formal empirical evidence documenting that one way in which prosecutors react to 
mandatory minimum sentencing laws is by systematically becoming more likely to prosecute 
those arrested for crimes targeted by these laws for lesser crimes not covered by these laws”). 
Other scholars have made similar findings. See id. at 594 n.10. 
 44. See Ronald F. Wright, Response, Guilty Pleas and Submarkets, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
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floor for p, these constraints also establish a floor for the effective 
standard of proof in cases involving first-time offenders, one that 
prosecutors can’t evade through plea bargaining.45 
In short, the economics of plea bargaining combined with increased 
penalties for repeat offenders and the variety of collateral and stigmatic 
consequences that hit first-time offenders with special force ensure that 
prosecutors can obtain guilty pleas from repeat offenders that the 
prosecutors could not have obtained from first-time offenders in cases 
with otherwise similar characteristics. Functionally, this is equivalent to 
applying a decreased standard of proof to repeat offenders in the 
system—plea bargaining—that produces the vast bulk of criminal 
convictions. 
II.  EVIDENCE RULES AND THE DECREASING STANDARD OF PROOF FOR 
REPEAT OFFENDERS 
The economics of plea bargaining are compounded by a variety of 
evidentiary and procedural rules that further disadvantage repeat 
offenders. These rules increase the probability of conviction for repeat 
offenders, with the same ultimate effect on conviction rates as would 
result from application of a lower standard of proof at trial. 
A.  Repeat Offenders Do Worse at Trial than First-Time Offenders 
Repeat offenders face substantially greater risks than first-time 
offenders at nearly every stage of the criminal process. During 
investigation, police are most likely to begin their investigation by 
identifying the “usual suspects.”46 Offenders with criminal records are 
more likely to be placed in a line-up or have their picture displayed in a 
photo array, are more likely to have fingerprint and DNA samples in 
databases available for comparison with specimens recovered at the 
crime scene, and are more likely to be questioned by investigators while 
their exculpatory stories are less likely to be believed.47 
                                                                                                                     
PENNUMBRA 68, 70 (2008) (stating that because “the fact of conviction should concern 
[defendants with no prior convictions] more than the amount of punishment, they are more 
likely to hold out for a dismissal or an acquittal in a weak case”). 
 45. This is not to say that prosecutors cannot induce first-time offenders to plead guilty in 
weak cases. If the charges are serious and the prosecutor’s discretion is relatively unconstrained, 
then prosecutors should have plenty of bargaining leverage to induce a guilty plea. The point 
here, however, is that the prosecutor’s leverage will always be relatively smaller in cases 
involving first-time offenders because graduated sentencing schemes limit the maximum 
punishment that can be expected upon conviction at trial and collateral and stigmatic 
consequences of felony convictions limit the minimum punishment that may be offered in plea 
bargaining. 
 46. See Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian [!?] 
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 672 (1991) (noting that investigation 
of crimes often begins “by focusing on those ‘usual suspects’ already known to law enforcement 
officials”). 
 47. See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1125–26 (explaining that “[r]ecidivists are common 
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Once charged with a crime, repeat offenders are more likely than 
first-time offenders to be denied bail or bond or to have a higher bail or 
bond set.48 Studies establish that pretrial detention substantially 
increases the probability of conviction.49 Indeed, pretrial detention leads 
to worse results for criminal defendants at every subsequent stage in the 
process, including sentencing.50 The likely reasons why pretrial 
detainees see worse outcomes include the inability of detainees to 
gather facts, track down witnesses, or otherwise assist overburdened 
defense lawyers to prepare their defense cases; increased difficulties 
faced by detainees in communicating with attorneys;51 and an increased 
likelihood that detainees will be perceived negatively by jurors who see 
them handcuffed or otherwise treated as guilty and dangerous by 
marshals and court officers during trial. Pretrial detention also gives the 
state new opportunities to gather incriminating evidence. Jailhouse 
informants may testify at trial about confessions allegedly made while 
the defendant was in captivity. Conversations, phone calls, and mail are 
all subject to scrutiny and may turn up incriminating admissions.52 
At trial itself, repeat offenders confront hazards not faced by first-
timers. Most importantly, repeat offenders risk the fact-finder learning 
of their prior criminal history. Although the rules of evidence nominally 
disallow such evidence from being used to establish bad character or 
propensity, critical exceptions exist to this bar. Prior crimes may be 
admissible, for instance, to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident.”53 At least in federal courts, as well as in some states, 
                                                                                                                     
first targets when crime happens” and that investigations often commence by asking crime 
victims or witnesses to review “mug-shot books composed exclusively of prior arrestees”). 
 48. See, e.g., Aaron Kupchik, Jeffrey Fagan & Akiva Liberman, Punishment, 
Proportionality, and Jurisdictional Transfer of Adolescent Offenders: A Test of the Leniency 
Gap Hypothesis, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 77 (2003) (presenting data on the effect of 
pretrial detention on juveniles charged with crimes and finding that prior record was an 
important predictor of pretrial detention). 
 49. See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys 
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1719, 1773 (“[P]retrial detention leads to higher conviction rates and longer 
sentences . . . .”). 
 50. See Cassia Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect 
Effects and Cumulative Disadvantage, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 879, 893–94 (2009) (showing, in an 
empirical study, that pretrial detention is a positive predictor of increased sentence length). 
 51. Colbert, Paternoster & Bushway, supra note 49, at 1720 (“[T]he delay in defense 
investigations and witness interviews caused by pretrial incarceration, impedes preparation of a 
defense and is a sure-fire prescription for miscarriages of justice and convicting innocents at 
trial.”). 
 52. Repeat offenders are also marginally more likely to be falsely targeted by informants 
because their “general involvement in crime” makes it easier to generate plausible incriminating 
accusations. See Robert P. Mosteller, The Special Threat of Informants to the Innocent Who Are 
Not Innocents: Producing “First Drafts,” Recording Incentives, and Taking a Fresh Look at the 
Evidence, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 519, 555 (2009). 
 53. FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
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evidence of a past sexual assault or child molestation offense is 
admissible to prove commission of similar crimes as long as such 
evidence is deemed relevant.54 In addition, criminal history will almost 
always be admissible for impeachment purposes.55 The risk that jurors 
might learn about a defendant’s criminal history if he chooses to testify 
places an enormous burden on the exercise of the right to testify.56 A 
defendant with a relatively minor criminal history may choose to run the 
risk of such impeachment. A defendant with an extensive criminal 
history almost certainly will not, given the devastating effect that such 
information will likely have on the jury’s perception of the defendant’s 
guilt.57 Data show that the impact of a jury learning about the 
defendant’s prior record is greatest in cases where the evidence of guilt 
is relatively weak, suggesting that in close cases, the threat of disclosure 
of the criminal record is at its peak.58  
Although defendants are formally assumed “innocent until proven 
guilty,” and their exercise of the right to silence is not lawfully held 
against them, as a practical matter, jurors often assume that defendants 
have some obligation to prove their innocence. A failure to rebut—or at 
least deny—plausible evidence of guilt put forth by the state will often 
cement the jury’s impression of guilt. In some cases, defendants may in 
fact have compelling stories to tell. Repeat offenders who cannot risk 
impeachment thus will be unable to present that exculpatory evidence. 
Such defendants are often limited to trying to poke holes in the 
prosecutor’s case rather than construct a coherent alternative narrative 
of innocence, which according to many trial strategists, is a far inferior 
defense.59 As a result, the defendant’s testimony is often a pivotal trial 
                                                                                                                     
 54. FED. R. EVID. 413 (sexual assault); FED. R. EVID. 414 (child molestation). California, 
Arizona, and the District of Columbia have rules similar to those applicable in federal court. See 
Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a 
Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
1353, 1375–77 (2009) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1101(a), 1108(a) (West 2007); ARIZ. R. 
EVID. § 404(c); Johnson v. United States, 610 A.2d 729 (D.C. 1992)). 
 55. See FED. R. EVID. 608–09 (permitting impeachment with prior bad acts and 
convictions relevant to truthfulness of witness); Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1355 (“All 
U.S. jurisdictions allow the use of some criminal convictions to impeach the credibility of a 
witness.”). 
 56. The Eisenberg and Hans study confirms that the existence of a prior record is a strong 
indicator that the defendant will decline to testify at trial. In the sample studied by Professors 
Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie Hans, 62% of defendants without a prior record testified while 
only 45% of defendants with a record testified. The study also disclosed greater disparities 
depending on case type, with 93% of defendants without prior records testifying in assault cases 
compared with 57% of defendants with prior records. Similar disparities were also reported in 
first-degree murder cases. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1371–74. 
 57. See id. at 1360–61 (summarizing studies of mock jurors as demonstrating that  jurors 
who learn about a defendant’s prior record will be more likely to convict because “[t]he 
evidence against a defendant with a prior record appears stronger”). 
 58. Id. at 1381–83. 
 59. See, e.g., Brian J. Foley, Applied Legal Storytelling, Politics, and Factual Realism, 14 
LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 17, 22 (2008) (summarizing presentation by Professor 
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event,60 and the defendant’s failure to testify in his own defense can be 
outcome determinative.61  
Defendants with no substantial criminal history will not be 
constrained by these concerns. Such defendants will be better positioned 
to directly rebut the state’s charges, explain incriminating evidence, and 
present a credible alternative narrative of events. Of course, those repeat 
offenders who choose to testify notwithstanding the collateral damage 
will likely be perceived as less credible witnesses.62 For all these 
reasons, ceteris paribus, repeat offenders will do worse at trial than 
first-timers.63 
Finally, repeat offenders do worse at sentencing than first-time 
offenders as well and not only because of recidivist sentencing schemes, 
mandatory minimums, and career criminal statutes. Even absent any 
statutory or guideline mandate, judges are far more likely to impose 
harsher sentences on repeat criminals than on first-timers.64 In death 
penalty cases, jurors are more likely to impose a death sentence on those 
with criminal histories than those without.65  
                                                                                                                     
Kevin Jon Heller explaining that “in general the best defense is a good alternative narrative”); 
see also Sunwolf, Talking Story in Trial: The Power of Narrative Persuasion, 24 THE 
CHAMPION 26, 27–28 (2000) (explaining tendency of jurors to understand trial as competition 
between competing stories). 
 60. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1369–70 (describing data gathered in survey 
of judges showing that defendant testimony was considered more important than that of police, 
eyewitnesses, co-defendants, and expert witnesses). 
 61. Friedman, supra note 46, at 666 (observing that in some cases where defendants 
decline to testify for fear of character impeachment, their “failure to take the stand is utterly 
disastrous, spelling the difference between conviction and acquittal”). 
 62. This would intuitively seem to be the case. Indeed, the very purpose of permitting 
prior convictions to be introduced during impeachment is that they are relevant to credibility. 
However, Professors Eisenberg and Hans’ data did not verify that intuition; nor has other 
experimental research demonstrated that perceptions of credibility are affected by knowledge of 
prior records. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1387. 
 63. That outcome has been confirmed in at least one empirical study. See Martha Myers, 
Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 781, 786–
88, 792–93 (1979) (finding, based on study of 201 Indiana jury trials, that juries are more likely 
to convict defendants with numerous prior convictions). 
 64. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines permit judges to downwardly adjust a 
sentence where the court finds the offender was a minor participant in the offense. See U.S. 
SENTENCING COMM’N GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (2010). Data shows that this mitigating 
provision was applied twice as often to defendants without criminal history compared with those 
with criminal history. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Linda Drazga Maxfield & Miles D. Harer, 
Past as Prologue: Reconciling Recidivism and Culpability, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 245, 263–64 
(2004). Congress has instructed the Sentencing Commission to be more lenient with regard to 
first-time offenders. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) (2006) (directing the Sentencing Commission to 
ensure that “guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than 
imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender”). 
 65. Not only does a prior criminal record often count as aggravating circumstances and/or 
increase the perceived dangerousness of defendants, but some statutes expressly make the death 
penalty available only for repeat offenders. For example, South Carolina passed a law in 2006 
that allowed the death penalty for repeat offenders of criminal sexual conduct with a minor, but 
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B.  Comparative Ease of Conviction as a Lower Standard of Proof 
The numerous disabilities faced by repeat offenders ensure that if 
they choose to fight charges at trial, they will lose more often than do 
those who have no prior criminal records. They face what might be 
called a “repeat offender tax.” The tax works in a variety of ways. Some 
of the disabilities have the effect of increasing the quantum of net 
evidence of guilt. Where a defendant is unable to gather exculpatory 
evidence that he otherwise might have found because he has been 
detained pretrial, and the state’s case remains the same, the net evidence 
of guilt increases. The net evidence of guilt also increases when the 
defendant’s testimony is made less credible as a result of impeachment, 
or when jurors find the prior crime evidence probative of intent, motive, 
or modus operandi. In such cases, there is simply more evidence of 
guilt—a larger q—and thus a greater likelihood of conviction. 
Prior crimes evidence may also directly lower the de facto standard 
of proof.66 Once the fact-finder learns of the defendant’s criminal past, 
the fact-finder may require less proof of guilt to convict.67 A mere 
preponderance of the evidence may well, as a practical matter, satisfy 
many jurors (and judges) who know the defendant is a convicted felon. 
Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Valerie Hans calculated that, in 
cases in which the evidence was relatively weak, disclosure of a 
criminal record to the jury alone increased the defendant’s probability 
of conviction from an average of one in five to more than 50%.68 And as 
we have seen, risk of disclosure of a criminal record is only one of 
many ways that criminal procedure disadvantages repeat offenders. 
Either way, the disabilities faced by repeat offenders increase the 
probability of conviction—by raising q or lowering s—in ways that are 
functionally equivalent to a reduced standard of proof.  
C.  Magnifying the Disparity 
As demonstrated above, the increased penalties imposed on repeat 
offenders permit prosecutors to negotiate guilty pleas from those 
offenders more easily and, because of the pricing realities of the plea 
bargaining system, have the functional effect of easing the standard of 
proof. Those disparities are further magnified by the various disabilities 
that repeat offenders confront should they choose to contest charges at 
                                                                                                                     
not for first-time offenders. See S.B. 1138, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005). Although that 
law is now unconstitutional in light of Kennedy v. Louisiana, it illustrates the point. See 
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2642, 2650–51 (2008) (holding the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits the death penalty for raping a child without the intent to kill). 
 66. See Lillquist, supra note 4, at 160–61 (observing that use of character evidence at trial 
likely affects standard of proof applied by decisionmakers at trial and leads to lower standard of 
proof for repeat offenders). 
 67. See Friedman, supra note 46, at 657 (noting the possibility that evidence of prior 
crimes may cause jury to “decide that the defendant is a bad person, and thus effectively lower 
the prosecution’s burden of persuasion”). 
 68. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 54, at 1385. 
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trial. In calculating whether to accept a plea offer, rational repeat 
offenders (and their counsel) must discount their chances of winning to 
reflect these disabilities. In other words, given any quantum of proof of 
guilt, repeat offenders will calculate a higher p than first-time offenders. 
Raising p has the same effect, vis-à-vis plea bargaining, as raising the 
expected trial sentence. It makes plea offers attractive that would not 
otherwise be so. Repeat offenders thus confront a compounded calculus 
at plea bargaining: they face potentially longer sentences and have a 
higher likelihood of conviction. These factors combine to substantially 
increase the relative attractiveness of any particular plea offer, and 
function identically to substantially decreasing the standard of proof for 
repeat offenders. 
III.  LONGITUDINAL GUILT 
Thus far, I have tried to demonstrate that, in practice, repeat 
offenders are convicted subject to a standard of proof below—and 
perhaps well below—that applicable to first-time offenders. Arguments 
for a variable formal proof standard, such as Professor Laudan’s 
suggestion that we should formally adopt lower proof standards for 
repeat offenders, seem less compelling once this larger picture of the 
criminal process is developed, even if one accepts the assumption that 
disparate treatment of repeat offenders is justified by the greater risks of 
future criminality they present. As the arguments in this Article show, 
formally lowering the standard of proof at trial for repeat offenders 
would only further magnify the disabilities such repeat offenders 
already face, and those disabilities have their greatest impact not on the 
small handful of cases that actually go to trial but on the much larger 
pool of cases that are resolved through guilty pleas. If a formal rule 
directed jurors to apply a lower standard of proof in cases involving 
repeat offenders at trial, it would only make it that much harder for 
repeat offenders to successfully contest criminal charges. As a result, 
prosecutors would obtain even greater leverage to plea bargain, 
resulting in yet harsher sentences and guilty pleas in cases involving 
more equivocal evidence of guilt. The risk that innocent persons will be 
induced to plead guilty would, of course, also increase. If prosecutors 
lacked leverage in plea bargaining, these might be consequences worth 
tolerating. There is no reason, however, to believe that prosecutors lack 
bargaining leverage or face difficulties inducing defendants to plead 
guilty. There is no mob clamoring at the courthouse gates for a trial; just 
the opposite: guilty pleas as a percentage of criminal convictions have 
been trending upward for decades.69 
In this final section, I suggest that, over the course of the past 
century and a half or so, our criminal justice system has undergone a 
substantial, evolutionary transformation—one largely driven, or at least 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 90–91 (2005) (describing the steady increase in plea bargaining 
rate since 1981). 
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made possible, by plea bargaining.70 Whether we acknowledge it or not, 
the system as it has developed has in the mine-run of cases abandoned 
the goal of making an accurate determination of historical facts at a high 
level of certainty (such as BARD embodies) or attempting to apportion 
blame and punishment based on that determination. Rather than solve 
“crimes,” the system’s primary goal is the identification of “criminals.” 
The criminal process as a whole (there are of course exceptions) is no 
longer constructed (if it ever was) to determine beyond a reasonable 
doubt whether X committed a particular crime on a particular occasion. 
Its goal is to make a determination, with as much accuracy as is possible 
to muster, that X is “a criminal.”71 That determination occurs over time, 
which is why I refer to it as “longitudinal.”  
Longitudinal guilt is the system’s implicit rejoinder to criticisms of a 
plea bargaining system that permits—indeed induces—defendants to 
plead guilty even in cases in which proof is weak or equivocal. Plea 
bargaining occurs relatively early in the investigative process, before all 
leads have been thoroughly pursued and all potential defenses explored. 
Often, defense lawyers and prosecutors negotiate plea deals with little 
more in hand than a police report.72 This is not a process likely to reveal 
factual nuance. When plea offers represent substantial discounts over 
expected trial sentences, as they usually do, rational defendants take the 
deals. When the deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the 
dice, regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is factually 
innocent.73 The risk of inaccurate results in the plea bargaining system 
thus seems substantial. 
The system of longitudinal guilt has safeguards built in to check its 
excesses. These safeguards begin with the substantial sentence 
discounts themselves inherent to plea bargains in weak cases. The more 
uncertainty there is regarding the defendant’s guilt in a particular case, 
the more likely the defendant can trade a guilty plea for a nominal 
punishment. First-time offenders usually are treated leniently because of 
their status as first-timers. They often receive probation rather than a 
                                                                                                                     
 70. See generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003) (establishing the birth of widespread plea bargaining around 
the mid-to-late 19th Century). 
 71. To use Professor Bernard Harcourt’s language, the criminal system has increasingly 
adopted actuarial methods based primarily on prior criminal history and deployed them in order 
“to know the criminal and to predict his criminality.” Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-
Well to the Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 135 (2003). 
 72. One study found that defense lawyers almost never visited the crime scene, even in 
murder cases, and interviewed witnesses in only 4% of felony cases. See Michael McConville & 
Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 581, 762–64 (1987). 
 73. The coercive force of the system is, in fact, at its peak where repeat offenders and 
relatively minor crimes are involved.  See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1119–22. 
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prison sentence.74 First-time felony offenders can frequently get felony 
charges reduced to misdemeanors, preserving their status as non-felons. 
The process by which convictions are obtained may not provide 
absolute certainty, or even remove all reasonable doubt, as to the 
defendant’s guilt. But the penalties are usually light. Under the logic of 
longitudinal guilt, the proof of accuracy of the conviction is not 
necessarily the product of the criminal process, or the evidence, that led 
to it; it is the test of time. If the offender stays clean post-conviction, the 
dust-up with the courts and police will eventually be forgotten. It is a 
minor stain on an otherwise more or less productive life. No harm, no 
foul.75 
If the offender subsequently finds him or herself again accused of 
criminal conduct, however, then suspicions about the offender’s 
criminal character are “confirmed.” Given the offender’s criminal 
record, potential trial sentences start to increase, and a second 
accusation will likely lead to a less generous plea offer than was 
available for the first offense. Although the enhanced penalties that 
attach to recidivist crimes can be justified with the traditional 
retributivist defense of recidivist penalties—that in offending again the 
offender demonstrated greater disregard for morality or law76—they are 
just as well understood as a kind of ex post facto amendment of the 
lighter penalty imposed previously. After all, subsequent incriminating 
conduct “lessens” the uncertainty accompanying the earlier conviction 
by strengthening the suspicion that the defendant possesses a “criminal” 
character.77  
In weak cases involving repeat offenders, prosecutors may settle for 
a guilty plea and another nominal punishment even though the proof of 
guilt in the new case is somewhat shakier than it was in prior cases. 
                                                                                                                     
 74. In the federal system, according to one study, first-time offenders with no prior 
contact with the criminal justice system received sentences carrying no prison time in 
approximately 53% of cases, compared with only 9.6% of cases involving defendants with a 
criminal history. See O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 264. 
 75. This is meant somewhat tongue-in-cheek. Of course, for the first-time felony offender, 
it is not really no harm, no foul. The collateral and stigmatic consequences of conviction impose 
a substantial cost. But the system accounts for that increased cost, to some extent, by providing 
more robust protections for such defendants. Because it is harder for prosecutors to plea bargain 
a first felony offense, prosecutors have incentives to ensure that the evidence is stronger in cases 
involving first-time offenders, and guilty pleas negotiated in such cases will more likely be 
induced in strong cases. This, in turn, provides more assurance that the conviction is reliable. 
 76. See, e.g., id. at 246 (noting the “long-standing idea . . . that repeat offenders are 
deserving of greater punishment because they are already familiar with the criminal justice 
system and ‘should have known better’”). 
 77. At least one scholar has explained this phenomenon as an optimal feature of a 
punishment system in which the risk of error is high. See Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as 
a Repeated Game, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 63, 77 n.31 (1994) (citing Ariel Rubinstein, An 
Optimal Conviction Expectation Regime for Offenses that May Have Been Committed by 
Accident, in APPLIED GAME THEORY (Steven John Brams, Andrew Schotter & Gerhard 
Schwödiauer eds., 1979)). 
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Prosecutors may feel comfortable prosecuting the defendant 
notwithstanding the evidentiary weakness of the new case because, 
given the prior record, less new evidence is necessary to confirm the 
repeat offender’s type as “criminal.”78 And so it goes. Repeat offenders 
confronting new allegations of wrongdoing face a spiraling set of 
consequences. Their prior convictions mean ever-longer expected 
sentences, which in turn further encourages them to cut their losses 
when they can through plea bargaining, which adds another entry to 
their criminal records and makes it even easier  for prosecutors to obtain 
a guilty plea against them the next time. In this way, an individual might 
go from being a first-time offender to a career criminal without ever 
having a jury conclude that the evidence proved guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
At the end of day, however, the system purports to have established 
to most everyone’s satisfaction what the criminal record shows: the 
defendant’s criminal character, i.e., his “recidivism risk.”79 What one 
plea deal didn’t reveal, a career record of criminal convictions proves: 
the defendant is a criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Any harsh 
penalties reserved for hardened criminals can be imposed without much 
worry about investigative or trial error given the increased risk of 
recidivism the defendant poses. Even if this conviction has problems, 
the defendant has proved his criminality over time. He is longitudinally 
guilty. 
Of course, this characterization of the criminal process does not 
accurately describe the handling of every criminal case. Some cases 
receive an enormous amount of attention and resources. Think O.J. 
Simpson. In those cases, the system rolls out the whole panoply of bells 
and whistles. It really does seem focused on uncovering historical truth, 
even when it doesn’t succeed at it very well. Indeed, the concept of 
longitudinal guilt may not capture what happens in most very serious 
criminal cases, the kind that provoke widespread community attention 
and close coverage of the investigation and trial. But it does capture, I 
suspect, the far more typical and mundane doings of the assembly-line 
criminal justice process that is characterized by overworked prosecutors 
and underfunded defense attorneys, and in which even serious criminal 
cases go largely uninvestigated, especially by defense counsel.80 
                                                                                                                     
 78. There is a baseline below which proof of guilt should not drop, provided by the 
probable cause requirement. The prosecutor must convince a judge, or a grand jury, that there is 
at least that much evidence to initiate charges in the first place. Theoretically, probable cause 
equates, more or less, with a more probable than not standard; this suggests that criminal cases 
do not lead to convictions, even by guilty plea, unless there is somewhere near a 50.1% 
likelihood that the defendant was, in fact, guilty. For a discussion of the relationship between 
probable cause and the more probable than not standard, see, for example, Max Minzner, 
Putting Probability Back into Probable Cause, 87 TEX. L. REV. 913, 927 n.62 (2009). 
 79. O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 278 (stating that the Federal Sentencing 
“Guidelines’ criminal history measures serve in significant part as a recidivism risk prediction 
instrument”). 
 80. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 72, at 762–64. 
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What can be said in favor of longitudinal guilt? Well, first, it is a 
relatively inexpensive system to operate. Longitudinal guilt uses the 
cheapest dispute resolution tactic—plea bargaining—to obtain most 
criminal convictions. By making guilty pleas cheap, plea bargaining 
reduces the investigative and prosecutorial resources needed to build 
adequate cases against defendants. That means that investigators and 
prosecutors can better ration their resources across cases and increase 
the deterrent effect of law enforcement.81 Second, the drop in accuracy 
in individual cases is compensated for by an increase in accuracy over 
time. Longitudinal guilt may well produce “accurate” results, in terms 
of identifying persons who have found themselves consistently on the 
wrong side of the law, as long as we accept a definition of accuracy 
based on the proposition that where there is smoke, at least most of the 
time, there is fire too. More importantly, perhaps, it has proven effective 
in identifying those who are most likely to find themselves on the 
wrong side of the law in the future. If the accumulation of a criminal 
record makes relatively clear who the bad guys are, it also, in turn, 
facilitates their management and control. Longitudinal guilt, in other 
words, is the predicate for the “new penology” built upon actuarial 
forms of risk management applied to crime control.82  
Longitudinal guilt necessarily places more emphasis on the initial 
stages of the criminal process. Where the resolution of criminal charges 
is heavily front-loaded, the content and type of the initial accusations 
and their alleged factual predicates are more likely to go unchallenged. 
Indeed, there is a movement afoot to incorporate prior arrests as well as 
prior convictions into criminal history sentencing calculations because 
prior arrests have been shown to be almost equally predictive of future 
criminality.83 This means that initial decisions about arrests and charges 
made by law enforcement officers will tend to have relatively greater 
importance and thus increase police power to make credible threats of 
legal penalties. This marginal increase in police power may assist them 
in maintaining order on the streets by magnifying their power to shape 
legal outcomes through arrest and offense characterization decisions. 
What are the costs of a system constructed around the concept of 
longitudinal guilt? There is, of course, the risk of error. There will be 
cases, for sure, where a trial conviction would be sufficiently disastrous 
that the collateral and stigmatic consequences will seem a small price to 
pay to avoid the risk. In those cases, potentially innocent defendants 
may well agree to falsely plead guilty to a serious charge. It is even 
                                                                                                                     
 81. See Easterbrook, supra note 18, at 309 (explaining that prosecutors prefer plea 
bargaining because it permits redeployment of “released resources” for “use in other cases, thus 
increasing deterrence”). 
 82. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 11–
12 (2003). See generally JONATHAN SIMON, POOR DISCIPLINE: PAROLE AND THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF THE UNDERCLASS, 1890–1990 (1993). 
 83. See O’Neill, Maxfield & Harer, supra note 64, at 248. 
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conceivable that such an individual, through a chain of unfortunate 
calamities, could be repeatedly dragooned into the system and, by way 
of aggressive loss-cutting, accumulate a criminal record 
notwithstanding innocence. But the likelihood of that happening seems 
remote. As noted above, the system of longitudinal guilt imposes the 
strongest de facto protections on first-time offenders, making wrongful 
convictions of such offenders relatively unlikely.84 Although its 
protections diminish for repeat offenders, it increasingly relies on 
statistical (im)probabilities to reduce the risk of systemic error. Even if 
justice provided no more accuracy than a coin toss, the odds that the 
coin will keep coming up heads becomes, at some point, statistically 
implausible. Moreover, even the severest critics of the system would 
probably concede that the probability of guilt in most cases exceeds a 
mere 50.1%, which is, in theory, its absolute floor.85 So accuracy seems 
a relatively minor concern.  
A greater concern, however, is the possibility that longitudinal guilt 
is a self-reinforcing system.86 Individuals who get caught up in the 
criminal justice system early in life get “tagged” as criminals. The 
stigma and collateral consequences that follow that early labeling affect 
the choice-set available to them. If individuals with criminal records 
cannot get jobs, social services, or student loans, criminal activity might 
well present an attractive, and perhaps the only, alternative source of 
income. If “decent” society shuns convicted criminals, then the “street” 
may be the only society open to them.87  
Longitudinal guilt is predicated on the essentialist premise that 
“true” criminals will reveal themselves through repeated criminal 
conduct, a claim that has won a fair measure of statistical backing. 
Perhaps the strongest criticism of longitudinal guilt is its tendency to 
disregard the possibility that criminals are made and not born, and that 
the system is the maker. In other words, longitudinal guilt may well 
confuse the problem with the solution; it fails to acknowledge that 
criminality might not be inherent in the character, genes, or 
psychological profile of offenders but rather could be a “problem with 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See Bowers, supra note 25, at 1121–22 (arguing that risk of wrongful conviction is 
greatest for repeat offenders who commit relatively minor crimes). 
 85. See discussion supra note 78. Whatever theoretical floor is established by the 
requirement that criminal charges survive the scrutiny of a probable cause determination, I think 
it is additionally safe to assume that most prosecutors would not prosecute if they did not 
believe the defendant was, at the least, more probably guilty than innocent. 
 86. Professor Harcourt refers to this problem as the “ratchet effect,” by which he means 
that statistically targeted populations in the criminal justice system will not only be subject to 
disproportionately more policing and punishment but will also be perceived by society as 
especially prone to criminality, thereby limiting their reentry options. See Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Henry Louis Gates and Racial Profiling: What’s the Problem? 17–20 (John M. Olin Law & 
Econ. Working Paper No. 482 (2d Series), 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474809. 
 87. Professor Elijah Anderson uses these terms in his classic qualitative study of street life 
in inner city communities. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 35 (1999). 
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prisons, punishment, or the lack of reentry programs.”88 The next 
criminal conviction may, in short, not prove that the defendant’s 
essential nature is “criminal” but reflect only the economic and social 
pressures of life as a convicted criminal, or indeed, nothing more than 
the increased difficulty of defending a criminal case as a repeat 
offender.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The plight of convicted criminals in our society, unforgiving as it is, 
is not the primary point of this Article. What I set out to show is simply 
that, by and large, repeat offenders do not receive the same benefit of 
the doubt as first-time offenders. The plea bargaining system accounts 
for upwards of 90% of all criminal convictions.89 As some 
commentators have observed, plea bargaining is not merely an aspect of 
our system of justice; it is our system of justice.90 In that system, 
prosecutors have enormous discretion to bargain with defendants and 
thereby determine the outcomes of prosecutions. Defendants, of course, 
have the ultimate power to decide whether to take the deal. Assuming 
that defendants bargain rationally, however, the two primary 
determinants of whether a deal is worth taking (setting aside the costs of 
litigation) are the sentences they expect to receive if they lose at trial 
and the probability that they will lose. Those two factors determine the 
economic value of a plea offer. Because expected sentences and the 
probability of losing at trial increase for repeat offenders, first-time 
offenders and repeat offenders are not on a level playing field. 
Prosecutors can induce repeat offenders to take plea offers that first-
timers should rationally refuse. That is the equivalent of reducing the 
standard of proof for repeat offenders at trial. Without a stronger 
showing of a crisis of dismissals or acquittals of repeat offenders, it 
seems to me that the burden of proof for lowering the burden of proof, 
so to speak, rests with those who believe the current disadvantages that 
repeat offenders face do not already account for the greater actuarial 
risks presented by them.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Harcourt, supra note 71, at 151.  
 89. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS  2000 at 457 (Kathleen Maquire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001) 
(reporting that 91% of all state court felony convictions in 1996 were obtained by guilty plea).  
 90. Cf. Rudolf J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 135, 145 (2001) 
(“Plea bargaining is not just a part of Arizona’s justice system; today it is the system. More than 
ninety-five percent of defendants enter guilty pleas.”).  
25
Covey: Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the Va
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011




Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss2/4
